Steven Trzaska v. LOreal USA Inc by unknown
2017 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
7-25-2017 
Steven Trzaska v. LOreal USA Inc 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2017 
Recommended Citation 
"Steven Trzaska v. LOreal USA Inc" (2017). 2017 Decisions. 571. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2017/571 
This July is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2017 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
  
 
PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
No. 15-3810 
________________ 
 
 
STEVEN J. TRZASKA, 
                            Appellant 
 
v. 
  
L’OREAL USA, INC.; L’OREAL, S.A. 
 
   ________________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-15-cv-02713) 
District Judge: Honorable Susan D. Wigenton 
________________ 
 
Argued November 16, 2016 
 
 
Before: AMBRO, CHAGARES,  
and FUENTES, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: July 25, 2017) 
 
 2 
 
Daniel Bencivenga 
Harold I. Goodman  (Argued) 
Raynes McCarty 
1845 Walnut Street, 20th Floor 
Philadelphia, PA    19103 
 
 Counsel for Appellant 
 
George P. Barbatsuly 
Laura Scully 
Christopher R. Carton (Argued) 
K&L Gates 
One Newark Center, 10th Floor 
Newark, NJ   07102 
 
Eric A. Savage  (Argued) 
Littler Mendelson 
900 Third Avenue, 8th Floor 
New York, NY   10022 
 
 Counsel for Appellees 
________________ 
 
OPINION  OF  THE  COURT 
________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 Steven J. Trzaska was an in-house patent attorney for 
L’Oréal USA, Inc. (“L’Oréal USA”), a cosmetics company.  
It fired him, he alleges, for his refusal to violate various 
ethical rules that govern the legal profession.  He asserts that 
this action violated New Jersey employment law, as one 
cannot be fired for refusing to violate regulations or public 
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policy at the instruction of his employer.  The District Court 
dismissed Trzaska’s claim without discovery.  Because his 
allegations against the beauty-products corporation are more 
than skin-deep, we reverse.  
I. BACKGROUND 
   Beginning in 2004, Trzaska was employed as the 
head of L’Oréal USA’s regional patent team in Clark, New 
Jersey, overseeing the process by which the latter would 
patent the company’s newly developed products and 
inventions.  The process would begin when an inventor 
submitted to the patent team an “invention disclosure” for a 
new product describing its potentially patentable subject 
matter.  A patent attorney on the team then vetted the 
invention disclosure to determine the product’s patentability 
by interviewing the inventor and searching L’Oréal USA’s 
internal database to confirm that the subject matter of the 
product did not already exist.  If the patent team determined 
that the product was patentable, an attorney prepared the 
necessary paperwork and submitted a patent application to the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”). 
     As with any legal practitioner, the attorneys on 
L’Oréal USA’s patent team were required to follow various 
ethical standards known as Rules of Professional Conduct 
that guide and regulate the legal profession.  Because he was 
admitted to practice law in Pennsylvania and before the 
USPTO, both the Rules of Professional conduct established 
by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania and the professional 
rules promulgated by the USPTO (collectively, the “RPCs”) 
governed Trzaska’s conduct.  In relevant part, these RPCs 
barred attorneys from filing frivolous or bad-faith patent 
applications or from knowingly making false statements 
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before a tribunal.1  Violations of the RPCs could result in 
sanctions or disbarment. 
 L’Oréal, S.A.—the French parent company of L’Oréal 
USA (collectively, “L’Oréal”)—established a global quota of 
                                              
 1 In relevant part, the RPCs of the USPTO provide: 
 
A practitioner shall not bring or 
defend a proceeding, or assert or 
controvert an issue therein, unless 
there is a basis in law and fact for 
doing so that is not frivolous, 
which includes a good-faith 
argument for an extension, 
modification or reversal of 
existing law[;] 
 
and 
 
A practitioner shall not knowingly 
. . . [m]ake a false statement of 
fact or law to a tribunal or fail to 
correct a false statement of 
material fact or law previously 
made to the tribunal by the 
practitioner . . . . 
 
37 C.F.R. §§ 11.301, 11.303(a)(1) (2013).  Trzaska also 
asserts that 37 C.F.R. §§ 11.18, 11.113, 11.201, and 11.804 
are relevant, as they relate to other pertinent forms of attorney 
misconduct.  Parallel provisions appear in Rules 1.13, 3.1, 
3.3, and 8.4 of the Pennsylvania RPCs.  See 204 Pa. Code § 
81.4. 
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patent applications that each regional office must file each 
year.  In 2014, the annual quota for Trzaska’s team was 40 
patent applications.  Management officials at L’Oréal told 
Trzaska and his team members that, if they failed to meet that 
quota, “there would be consequences which would negatively 
impact their careers and/or continued employment.”  J.A. at 
32.  At the same time, L’Oréal adopted an initiative to 
improve the quality of patent applications it filed with the 
USPTO.  Adopting this company policy resulted in fewer 
invention disclosures submitted to the patent team for vetting.  
 With two competing company policies in place—one 
that required the patent team to meet an annual minimum of 
patent applications and one that effectively reduced the 
amount of invention disclosures that could be evaluated—
Trzaska’s team found itself in a  predicament.  According to 
several members of the team, there were very few patentable 
products submitted to it for vetting while L’Oréal continued 
to demand that the team meet the annual quota.  
Consequently, the patent team did not believe it was able to 
meet the mandatory quota for 2014 without filing patent 
applications for products that it did not in good faith believe 
were patentable.  And, as L’Oréal had threatened, if the team 
did not meet that quota, the patent attorneys’ job security 
would be in peril.     
 In the hope of resolving this professional Catch-22, 
Trzaska approached his superiors.  He explained that neither 
he nor his team would be willing to file any patent 
applications for products that they in good faith believed were 
not patentable.  He advised management that if any attorney 
on the patent team filed such a patent application, he or she 
would be in violation of the ethical standards—or RPCs—to 
which they were bound as licensed patent attorneys.  Though 
Trzaska did not identify any offending patent application that 
he nonetheless was instructed to file, he informed his 
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superiors that he would not do so should he come across one, 
even if that meant that the annual quota would not be met.   
 Apparently L’Oréal did not receive well Trzaska’s 
protest.  In the weeks following Trzaska’s meeting with 
management, L’Oréal offered him two severance packages 
that he could accept so long as he left the company.  If he 
chose not to leave, he was instructed to “go back to [his] 
office and get back to work.”  J.A. at 34.  After he rejected 
both severance packages offered, L’Oréal fired Trzaska, 
stating that his position was no longer needed. 
 Trzaska brought suit in District Court against both 
L’Oréal entities for wrongful retaliatory discharge in violation 
of the New Jersey Conscientious Employee Protection Act 
(“CEPA”), N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:19-1 et seq.  Among other 
things, CEPA protects an employee from retaliatory 
termination following his disclosure of the employer’s 
violation of law or his refusal to participate in illegal activity 
at the request of the employer, including a practice that the 
employee believes contravenes public policy.  Trzaska 
alleged he was fired because he refused to participate in an 
illegal activity by filing frivolous or bad-faith patent 
applications that would violate the RPCs and his ethical 
obligations as a licensed patent attorney. 
 The District Court dismissed Trzaska’s claims under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) because in its view 
the RPCs were an inadequate basis to maintain his CEPA 
claim.  It reasoned that, because the RPCs do not govern any 
activities, ethical obligations, or business decisions of the 
L’Oréal entities, they did not violate any law on which a 
CEPA claim could be based.  It further determined that 
Trzaska failed to show he had a reasonable belief that L’Oréal 
had violated a law or that a violation was imminent (which it 
deemed a necessary element for a CEPA claim).  
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(Interestingly, the Court also dismissed Trzaska’s claims 
against L’Oréal, S.A. for the same reasons even though it 
only sought a Rule 12(b)(5) dismissal for insufficient service 
of process.)  This appeal followed.   
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 We have jurisdiction over final orders of the District 
Court per 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review de novo a district 
court’s dismissal of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) for 
failure to state a claim.  Chavarriaga v. N.J. Dep’t of Corr., 
806 F.3d 210, 218 (3d Cir. 2015).  When conducting our 
review, “we must accept the allegations in the complaint as 
true . . . [but] are not compelled to accept unsupported 
conclusions and unwarranted inferences, or a legal conclusion 
couched as a factual allegation.”  Morrow v. Balaski, 719 
F.3d 160, 165 (3d Cir. 2013) (quotations omitted). 
III. ANALYSIS 
 A. RPCs and CEPA Violations 
 “CEPA . . . protect[s] employees from retaliatory 
actions by employers . . . .”  Blackburn v. United Parcel 
Serv., Inc., 179 F.3d 81, 91 (3d Cir. 1999) (quotations 
omitted).  To that end, courts construe it flexibly.  Id.  It 
provides in relevant part: 
An employer shall not take any retaliatory 
action against an employee because the 
employee does any of the following: 
. . . 
(c) Objects to, or refuses to participate in any 
activity, policy or practice which the employee 
reasonably believes: (1) is in violation of a law, 
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or a rule or regulation promulgated pursuant to 
law . . .; (2) is fraudulent or criminal . . .; or (3) 
is incompatible with a clear mandate of public 
policy concerning the public health, safety or 
welfare or protection of the environment. 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:19-3(c).2  Accordingly, a plaintiff must 
identify a law, rule, regulation, or clear mandate of public 
policy, that supports the basis of his CEPA claim as well as 
“unacceptable practices in the defendant employer’s 
                                              
 2 Trzaska insists that N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:19-3(a) also 
applies to his claims because the RPCs imposed ethical duties 
on “L’Oréal [that it] owed to the PTO.”  Br. for Appellant at 
40.  That section protects an employee from retaliatory 
discharge following the employee’s whistleblowing of his 
employer’s illegal conduct.  Despite Trzaska’s argument, we 
agree with the District Court that that the RPCs—which 
regulate attorney conduct—do not govern the business 
activity of non-legal practitioners such as L’Oréal.  Under 
Trzaska’s theory, there is no violation of that CEPA 
provision.  However, as discussed below, L’Oréal’s alleged 
instruction to disregard the RPCs constitutes a CEPA 
violation under N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:19-3(c) (refusal to 
participate in illegal activity).  It is possible, therefore, that 
this violation of subsection (c) could be bootstrapped as a 
violation of subsection (a) (“disclos[ing] . . . to a supervisor . . 
. an activity, policy, or practice of the employer” that “is in 
violation of the law”).  Trzaska has made no such allegation, 
however, and thus we need not address this hypothetical 
argument.    
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business” that contravene the identified authority.  Hitesman 
v. Bridgeway, Inc., 93 A.3d 306, 321 (N.J. 2014).3   
 Following these guidelines, an allegation that an 
employer instructed, coerced, or threatened its patent attorney 
employee to disregard the RPCs binding him violates a clear 
mandate of public policy within the meaning of CEPA.  See 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:19-3(c).  Terminating that employee for 
refusing to follow such an instruction or its equivalent 
triggers CEPA protection for two reasons. 
 First, “[a] patent by its very nature is affected with a 
public interest.” Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. 
Found., 402 U.S. 313, 343 (1971) (quotations omitted).  It 
“favors the maintenance of a well-functioning patent system.”  
Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC, 134 S. Ct. 
843, 851 (2014); see also King Drug Co. of Florence, Inc. v. 
Smithkline Beecham Corp., 791 F.3d 388, 394 (3d. Cir. 2015) 
(“A patent, consequently, is a special privilege designed to 
serve the public . . . .” (quotations omitted)).  Accordingly, 
“the relationship of attorneys to the Patent Office requires the 
highest degree of candor and good faith,” Kingsland v. 
Dorsey, 338 U.S. 318, 319 (1949) (quotations omitted), which 
includes adherence to the USPTO’s RPCs and regulations 
                                              
 3 Our dissenting colleague believes that “a cause of 
action under CEPA is stated only when illegal activity is 
occurring or imminent.”  Dissent at 5.  We disagree, as “when 
a plaintiff brings an action pursuant to [CEPA], the trial court 
must identify a statute, regulation, rule, or public policy that 
closely relates to the complained-of conduct. . . . [A] plaintiff 
[need not] allege facts that, if true, actually would violate that 
statute, rule, or public policy.”  Dzwonar v. McDevitt, 828 
A.2d 893, 901 (N.J. 2003).  Regardless, as discussed below, 
Trzaska has alleged conduct that contravenes public policy.  
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governing the submission of good-faith, non-frivolous patent 
applications.  A well-functioning patent system cannot exist 
without it.  An employer’s directive to its employees to 
disregard these RPCs thus crosses a clear mandate of public 
policy.  Moreover, while the USPTO’s RPCs fall within 
CEPA’s public policy provision, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:19-
3(c)(3), they also are codified federal regulations, implicating 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:19-3(c)(1) as well.  See, e.g., 37 C.F.R. 
§§ 11.301, 11.303(a)(1). 
 Second, rules of professional conduct in general can 
underlay a CEPA violation.  “In New Jersey, [the courts] are 
deeply committed to the principle that an employer’s right to 
discharge an employee carries a correlative duty to protect his 
freedom to decline to perform an act that would constitute a 
violation of a clear mandate of public policy.”  Abbamont v. 
Piscataway Twp. Bd. of Educ., 650 A.2d 958, 971 (N.J. 1994) 
(quotations omitted).  To stymie that duty finds the employer 
afoul of CEPA.  See Parker v. M&T Chemicals, Inc., 566 
A.2d 215, 219-20 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989) (in-house 
patent counsel’s adherence to a state Supreme Court’s ethical 
Rules of Professional Conduct constitutes a clear mandate of 
public policy that CEPA protects); see also Weiss v. 
Carpenter, Bennett & Morrison, 672 A.2d 1132, 1144 (N.J. 
1996) (holding generally, in the arbitration context, that New 
Jersey “precedents demonstrate quite clearly that the Rules of 
Professional Conduct . . . express a clear mandate of public 
policy”); Pierce v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 417 A.2d 505, 512 
(N.J. 1980) (in a case giving rise to the passage of CEPA, the 
New Jersey Supreme Court determined that non-
administrative Rules of Professional Conduct may contain 
expressions of public policy, and a request to violate them 
serves as a basis for wrongful termination).  An employee 
cannot be terminated for refusing to violate or disregard 
ethical standards regulating his profession, as public policy in 
New Jersey requires that he follow them.   
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 Given these two principles—that the abuse of the 
patent application system and the violation of Rules of 
Professional Conduct harm the public’s interest—an 
employer’s policy effecting the disregard of the RPCs 
contravenes clear mandates of public policy within the 
meaning of CEPA.  As such, an allegation that an employer 
promulgates such a policy serves as an adequate basis to 
bring a CEPA claim.  See Tartaglia v. UBS PaineWebber 
Inc., 961 A.2d 1167, 1182-83 (N.J. 2008) (CEPA requires “an 
expression by the employee of a disagreement with a 
corporate policy, directive, or decision based on a clear 
mandate of public policy,” and in those contexts the 
“termination [itself] violates a public policy mandate.”) 
 The District Court determined that the applicable 
RPCs could not serve as a basis for a CEPA violation because 
they do not regulate L’Oréal’s business practices.  That 
conclusion may be correct, but the basis of the CEPA claim 
here is not L’Oréal’s violation of the RPCs; rather, it is the 
instruction to its employees that would result in the disregard 
of their RPC duties and hence violates a mandate of public 
policy.  CEPA is clear: an employee cannot be terminated for 
refusing to participate in conduct that he reasonably believes 
violates public policy.  This is especially so because we must 
construe the statute’s protections liberally.  See Blackburn, 
179 F.3d at 90.  Accordingly, the failure to follow instructions 
that effectively disregard RPCs forms a CEPA claim.  
 B. Trzaska’s Allegations 
 The District Court determined that, regardless whether 
an employer’s instruction to an employee that would result in 
the disregard of that employee’s professional ethical 
standards can be the basis of a CEPA claim, Trzaska failed to 
plead adequately such a claim.  It found that Trzaska did not 
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allege that L’Oréal had violated a law or public policy or that 
such a violation was imminent.  His apparent failure to do so, 
the Court believed, was fatal to his CEPA claim.  We 
disagree. 
 First, as stated above, professional ethical codes can 
serve as a basis to state a claim under CEPA when an 
employee is coerced to disregard them.  In New Jersey 
the sensible meaning of CEPA is that the 
objecting employee must have an objectively 
reasonable belief, at the time of objection or 
refusal to participate in the employer’s 
offensive activity, that such activity is . . . 
incompatible with a constitutional, statutory or 
regulatory provision, code of ethics, or other 
recognized source of public policy.  Specific 
knowledge of the precise source of public 
policy is not required. 
Mehlman v. Mobil Oil Corp., 707 A.2d 1000, 1015 (N.J. 
1998).  Trzaska’s allegations thereby come within the scope 
of CEPA protection, especially in light of the liberal 
construction afforded the statute.  See Blackburn, 179 F.3d at 
90. 
 Second, we disagree with the District Court that 
Trzaska’s CEPA claim should be brushed away because his 
“pleadings contain no evidence that [L’Oréal] demanded or 
ordered that [he] or others relinquish their professional 
judgments or obligations.”  Trzaska v. L’Oréal USA, Inc. et 
al., Civil Action No. 2:15-cv-02713-SDW-SCM, 2015 WL 
6687661, at *5 (D.N.J. Oct. 30, 2015).  That statement 
misapplies the standard of review at the motion-to-dismiss 
stage.  There, a court must consider no more than whether the 
complaint establishes “enough facts to raise a reasonable 
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expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the 
necessary elements” of the cause of action.  Connelly v. Lane 
Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 789 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting 
Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 
2009) (quotation and alteration omitted)).  A plaintiff’s 
allegations must be accepted as true and construed in the light 
most favorable to him when determining if his complaint 
should be dismissed.  Phillips, 515 F.3d at 231 (quotations 
omitted). 
 Trzaska’s complaint has met this threshold.  It alleges 
there was a company policy of meeting the patent application 
quota regardless whether the applications submitted were for 
products that he did not believe were patentable.  He also 
claimed that he and other colleagues were implicitly 
instructed to disregard the RPCs in order to meet the quota 
and that his supervisors expressly rejected his concern about 
violating the RPCs.  And, to close the circle, L’Oréal 
threatened to terminate his employment if he did not meet the 
quota.  J.A. at 32, 35-36.  If these allegations are taken as 
true, which they must be for the purposes of deciding a 
motion to dismiss, Trzaska has alleged a colorable violation 
of CEPA.  Whether he was in fact instructed to violate the 
RPCs is determined later in the litigation process.4   
                                              
 4 Our dissenting colleague does not refute that these 
allegations have been pled in Trzaska’s first amended 
complaint; rather, he thinks those factual allegations are 
insufficient to state a claim.  We again part ways.  First, the 
dissent describes these allegations as “conclusory.”  Dissent 
at 6, 9.  We think that characterization mistakenly blurs the 
distinction between factual allegations—which we must 
accept as true—with conclusory legal assertions—which we 
can reject.  See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).  
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Second, Trzaska has pled that he and his colleagues were 
instructed to meet the quota “or else,” and that management 
ignored his concerns about violating his ethical duties.  Given 
the facts provided in his complaint, Trzaska has alleged he 
had a reasonable belief that his employer was either 
instructing or coercing him to disregard the RPCs, which—as 
the dissent agrees—is a violation of public policy sufficient to 
serve as the basis of a CEPA claim.  That reasonable belief is 
all that is required at the pleading stage.  Dzwonar, 828 A.2d 
at 900-02.  The heightened standard that the dissent would 
have us impose is inappropriate when considering a motion to 
dismiss. 
 
 On this point, the dissent believes that we should hold 
Trzaska to a higher standard because he is an attorney.  
Dissent at 9.  It cites to Tartaglia v. UBS PaineWebber Inc., 
961 A.2d 1167 (N.J. 2008), for this assertion.  Tartaglia dealt 
with a claim brought under Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical 
Corporation, 417 A.2d 505 (N.J. 1980), which created the 
common-law antecedent to CEPA.  In Tartaglia, the plaintiff 
sought relief from wrongful termination following whistle-
blowing of her employer’s own ethical violations.  The New 
Jersey Supreme Court determined that the plaintiff, an 
attorney who internally complained about her employer’s 
RPC violation, was held to a “higher standard” of 
demonstrating an actual RPC violation occurred (as opposed 
to a reasonable belief that one occurred) because, as an 
attorney, she was more knowledgeable about the RPCs and 
under them was obligated to report another’s violation.  
Tartaglia, 961 A.2d at 1184-85.  That case does not apply to 
what is before us: it dealt with an attorney-employer’s own 
RPC violations (ours does not); a Pierce whistle-blowing 
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 Trzaska’s amended complaint makes allegations that 
are hardly cosmetic.  Hence he has sufficiently pled a CEPA 
claim, and that claim should not be dismissed at this stage in 
the litigation.  
 C. L’Oréal, S.A.’s Motion to Dismiss 
 L’Oréal, S.A. filed a motion to dismiss Trzaska’s 
appeal as to it because Trzaska did not initially file a notice of 
appeal as required by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 
3(c)(1)(B).  Specifically, L’Oréal USA and L’Oréal, S.A. are 
two separate defendants, they have separate counsel, and they 
each filed separate motions to dismiss Trzaska’s complaint on 
different grounds.  The District Court dismissed the complaint 
against L’Oréal USA for the reasons stated above and, in a 
companion order issued the same day, denied as moot 
L’Oréal, S.A.’s motion to dismiss for improper service and 
instead dismissed Trzaska’s complaint against it for the same 
reasons the Court gave in dismissing the complaint against 
L’Oréal USA.  Trzaska only attached to his notice of appeal 
the order that dismissed his complaint as to L’Oréal USA.  
 
 A notice of appeal must specify the “judgment, order, 
or part thereof being appealed.”  Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(1)(B).  
However, “[t]his court will exercise appellate jurisdiction 
over orders that are not specified in the notice of appeal 
where: (1) there is a connection between the specified and 
unspecified orders; (2) the intention to appeal the unspecified 
order is apparent; and (3) the opposing party is not prejudiced 
                                                                                                     
claim regarding that violation (ours does not); and a claim 
that has a statutory corollary in N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:19-3(a) 
(which we have noted above Trzaska has not sufficiently pled 
as stated in his complaint, as opposed to his claims under § 
34:19-3(c)). 
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and has a full opportunity to brief the issues.”  Polonski v. 
Trump Taj Mahal Assocs., 137 F.3d 139, 144 (3d. Cir. 1998) 
(citations omitted).  In this vein, “our jurisprudence liberally 
construes notices of appeal.”  Sulima v. Tobyhanna Army 
Depot, 602 F.3d 177, 184 (3d Cir. 2010) (quotations omitted).   
 
 The Polonski factors point to our jurisdiction.  No 
doubt there is a connection between the specified and 
unspecified orders; they were issued the same day and relied 
exclusively on the same opinion.  Given that Trzaska sought 
appellate review of that opinion, it is easy to infer his 
intention to appeal both orders that relied on it in dismissing 
his entire complaint against both defendants.  Finally, 
L’Oréal, S.A. has failed to demonstrate how it has been 
prejudiced and has not had a full opportunity to brief the 
issues.  The Clerk of Court sent notice of the appeal to 
L’Oréal, S.A.’s counsel shortly after it was filed requesting 
that he enter his appearance.  L’Oréal, S.A. then waited five 
months to file its motion to dismiss the appeal.  Most 
importantly, L’Oréal, S.A. has had a full opportunity to brief 
the issues, which it has done.  Therefore, because of the 
connection between the orders, Trzaska’s inferred intent to 
appeal both of them, and the lack of prejudice to L’Oréal, 
S.A., we deny L’Oréal, S.A.’s motion to dismiss the appeal. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 An instruction, coercion, or threat by an employer that 
would result in the disregard of obligatory ethical standards of 
one’s profession violates a clear mandate of public policy 
within the meaning of CEPA.  Under it, an employee cannot 
be terminated for refusing to engage in conduct in which he 
or she is prohibited from engaging.  We therefore reverse the 
District Court’s dismissal and remand the case for further 
proceedings without dismissing Trzaska’s appeal as to 
L’Oréal, S.A.  
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CHAGARES, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting 
in part.   
 
I agree with my learned colleagues that rules of 
professional conduct (“RPCs”) can serve as an adequate 
foundation for a claim under the New Jersey Conscientious 
Employee Protection Act (“CEPA”), N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:19-
1.  I also agree with my colleagues’ conclusion as to the 
motion to dismiss filed by L’Oréal, S.A., the parent company.  
I therefore join the majority’s opinion as to section III, parts 
A and C.  I disagree, however, that Trzaska pled a cognizable 
CEPA claim in the amended complaint or otherwise satisfied 
the heightened standard applying to him as an attorney 
proceeding on a CEPA claim.  I therefore cannot join section 
III, part B and respectfully dissent from the majority as to its 
conclusion and judgment.  
 
I. 
 
The pertinent facts alleged in the amended complaint 
are as follows.  Plaintiff Steven Trzaska was admitted to 
practice law in Pennsylvania in 1989 and admitted to practice 
before the United States Patent and Trademark Office in in 
1992.  He began working for L’Oréal, USA, Inc. (“L’Oréal”) 
in 2004.  Since at least the start of Trzaska’s employment at 
L’Oréal, L’Oréal’s parent company “set a predetermined 
numerical quota of how many patent applications it was to 
file globally on an annual basis.”  Appendix (“App.”) 27.  
The reason for the quota, according to Trzaska, “[was] to 
maintain and bolster the reputation of [L’Oréal] to financial 
analysts and shareholders following its stock, as innovative 
science-based players in the field of cosmetics.”  App. 28.  
The global quota was unchanged from at least 2012. 
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Working within the contours of this quota became 
objectionable to Trzaska as of October 2014, and that month 
he complained about the quota to the Global CFO of the 
Research and Innovation Organization of the parent company.  
Specifically, Trzaska “advised that neither he nor the patent 
attorneys who reported to him were willing to file patent 
applications that the attorneys believed were not 
patentable . . . .”  App. 34.  Thereafter, the head of Human 
Resources for Research in the United States offered Trzaska 
two options:  a severance package if he would leave 
L’Oréal’s employment or that he could “go back to [his] 
office and get back to work.”  App. 34.  Trzaska received an 
offer for a more substantial severance package shortly 
thereafter but did not accept it. On December 8, 2014, 
L’Oréal terminated Trzaska. 
 
Notwithstanding Trzaska’s issues with the quota — 
which was the same as previous years — the amended 
complaint reveals that Trzaska’s team had 87.5% of its Notice 
of Inventions, an abbreviated version of the invention 
disclosure, approved by October 2014.  App. 30–31.  Further, 
despite Trzaska’s complaint about the patentability of certain 
applications, Trzaska acknowledged that in 2014, L’Oréal 
began “an internal initiative to improve the quality of patent 
applications being filed by L’Oréal.”  App. 33.  Highlights of 
this 2014 initiative included “requiring inventors to provide 
examples evidencing that the proposed inventions performed 
as represented. . . .”  App. 33.  This initiative supplemented 
the already robust “vetting” process that was in place to 
ensure that “the subject matter of the invention is novel and 
unobvious” and to assist the reviewing patent attorney in 
making a “good faith determination whether the subject 
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matter in an invention disclosure is potentially patentable.”  
App. 32–33. 
 
II. 
 
My colleagues in the majority maintain that the 
District Court misapplied the standard of review at the 
motion-to-dismiss stage.1  I do not agree.  A district court 
must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and 
construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff.  Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d 
Cir. 2008).  It need not, however, credit naked assertions or 
bald allegations “devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’”  
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. 
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007)).  Further, a 
district court should not credit mere speculation or 
“unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences.” 
Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(citing Schuylkill Energy Res., Inc. v. Pa. Power & Light Co., 
113 F.3d 405, 417 (3d Cir. 1997)); see also Twombly, 550 
U.S. at 555 (“Factual allegations must be enough to raise a 
right to relief above the speculative level.”).  A district court 
should disregard labels and legal conclusions, and “a 
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will 
not do.”  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.  To require anything less 
here would be to “unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff 
armed with nothing more than conclusions.”  Iqbal, 556 U.S. 
at 678–79. 
A. 
                                              
1We exercise de novo review over a District Court’s dismissal 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  Curry v. 
Yachera, 835 F.3d 373, 377 (3d Cir. 2016).  
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To state a prima facie case under CEPA, a plaintiff 
must establish that:  
 
(1) he or she reasonably believed that his or her 
employer’s conduct was violating either a law, rule, or 
regulation promulgated pursuant to law, or a clear 
mandate of public policy; (2) he or she performed a 
‘whistle-blowing’ activity described in N.J.S.A. 34:19-
3c; (3) an adverse employment action was taken 
against him or her; and (4) a causal connection exists 
between the whistle-blowing activity and the adverse 
employment action. 
 
Dzwonar v. McDevitt, 828 A.2d 893, 900 (N.J. 2003).  
 
Trzaska’s amended complaint fails to satisfy the first 
element of the CEPA prima facie case.  This is because he has 
failed to meet the requirement that “a plaintiff must set forth 
facts that would support an objectively reasonable belief that 
a violation has occurred.”  Id. at 901. 
 
The New Jersey Supreme Court, in evaluating the 
reasonableness of a plaintiff’s beliefs regarding an employer’s 
conduct, has cautioned that CEPA “is not intended to spawn 
litigation concerning the most trivial or benign employee 
complaints.”  Estate of Roach v. TRW, Inc., 754 A.2d 544, 
552 (N.J. 2000).  CEPA thus does not protect “chronic 
complainers or those who simply disagree with their 
employer’s lawful actions.”  Blackburn v. United Parcel 
Serv., 179 F.3d 81, 93 n.4 (3d Cir. 1999); see also Young v. 
Schering Corp., 645 A.2d 1238, 1246 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 1994) (noting that CEPA “was not intended to provide a 
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remedy for wrongful discharge for employees who simply 
disagree with an employer’s decision, where that decision is 
entirely lawful”), aff’d, 660 A.2d 1153 (N.J. 1995).  Nor does 
it “shelter every alarmist who disrupts his employer’s 
operations by constantly declaring that illegal activity is 
afoot-or . . . is about to be afoot.”  Blackburn, 179 F.3d at 93 
n.4.  New Jersey courts have therefore held that a plaintiff 
who “simply disagrees with the manner in which the 
[employer] is operating” may not proceed on a CEPA claim.  
Hitesman v. Bridgeway Inc., 93 A.3d 306, 320 (N.J. 2014) 
(quoting Klein v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 871 
A.2d 681, 689 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005)). 
 
To determine whether an employee’s belief should “be 
considered ‘reasonable,’” our esteemed colleague, Judge 
Barry, then sitting as a District Judge, correctly observed 
“that belief must be such that ‘a reasonable lay person would 
conclude that illegal activity was going on’ or, at the very 
least, is imminent.”  Blackburn v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 3 
F. Supp. 2d 504, 515 (D.N.J. 1998) (quoting Young, 645 
A.2d at 1238), aff’d, 179 F.3d 81 (3d Cir. 1999).  
Accordingly, subject to the exception discussed infra, a cause 
of action under CEPA is stated only when illegal activity is 
occurring or imminent.   
 
With these essential principles in mind, I turn to the 
factual makeup of this case. Even taking the factual 
allegations in the light most favorable to him, Trzaska did not 
allege an objectively reasonable belief of past or imminent 
wrongdoing.  Trzaska averred no facts suggesting that 
L’Oréal requested or demanded that he relinquish his 
professional obligations in evaluating or submitting patent 
applications.  See Oral Arg. Tr. at 5 (Trzaska’s counsel 
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conceding that L’Oréal did not tell Trzaska to file “frivolous 
or unwarranted patent claims”); see generally Johnson v. N.J. 
Higher Educ. Student Assistance Auth., No. A-3102-13T1, 
2015 WL 6739525, at *6 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Nov. 5, 
2015) (concluding the plaintiff’s assertions were “patently 
insufficient” to support a CEPA claim when the plaintiff 
failed to allege that her employer “told her to fabricate facts, 
falsify documents, or falsely implicate others”).  Nor did 
Trzaska allege that he informed his employer before 
September 2014 that he was displeased with the quality of 
invention disclosures or concerned about the quota policy.  In 
this regard, the only specific notice that Trzaska alleges that 
he gave to his employer is that he advised the company “that 
neither he nor the patent attorneys who reported to him were 
willing to file patent applications that the attorneys believed 
were not patentable . . . .”  App. 34.  Yet, the amended 
complaint failed to identify even a single defective patent 
application that was submitted at any point during Trzaska’s 
ten years of employment at L’Oréal — a period that entirely 
coincided with the existence of the global quota policy.  See 
Oral Arg. Tr. at 5 (Trzaska’s counsel responding in the 
negative to the question were any “frivolous or unwarranted 
patent claims . . . filed by Mr. Trzaska and/or his office?”). 
Such conclusory allegations fail to support the requirement 
that illegal activity was afoot or imminent.  See Blackburn, 3 
F. Supp. 2d at 515. 
 
Trzaska’s allegations in the amended complaint 
actually refute rather than support his claims of wrongdoing.  
For instance, the amended complaint detailed at length the 
elaborate procedures used to “vet[]” an invention disclosure 
as well as the “internal initiative” L’Oréal adopted to improve 
overall quality in patent applications.  App. 32–33.  These 
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detailed factual allegations undercut any suggestion that 
management encouraged the submission of frivolous patent 
applications.  Any claim of wrongdoing on L’Oréal’s part is 
further undermined by the fact that, at the time of his 
termination, Trzaska’s team had nearly completed its annual 
quota requirement and seemingly had ample time to submit 
the remaining invention disclosures.   
 
These facts, taken together, suggest that Trzaska at 
most alleged a policy disagreement with L’Oréal over the 
efficacy of the quota system.  Such “routine dispute[s] in the 
workplace,” however, are insufficient to state a viable CEPA 
claim.  See Hitesman, 93 A.3d at 319; see also Klein, 871 
A.2d at 690 (rejecting a CEPA claim when the plaintiff’s 
concerns were essentially “disagreements with the internal 
procedures and priorities” of his employer).  I would thus 
hold that Trzaska failed to state the first element of a prima 
facie CEPA claim.   
Trzaska’s arguments to the contrary are unavailing.  
Trzaska argues, for instance, that he pled a viable claim 
because he alleged that he “and his patent attorney colleagues 
were informed that if the 2014 target of . . . filed patent 
applications was not met, there would be consequences which 
would negatively impact their careers and continued 
employment.”  App. 32.  Trzaska has not plausibly suggested, 
however, that the quota itself was improper or unlawful.  See 
Young, 645 A.2d at 1246 (affirming the dismissal of a CEPA 
claim where the challenged conduct “was not unlawful or 
wrongful in any way”).2  Moreover, this bare, unspecific 
                                              
2 The majority’s holding might come as a surprise to law 
firms, for instance, if it were to be applied in that context.  If a 
law firm sets a minimum number of billable hours and an 
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factual allegation should not be credited.  There is no 
indication in the amended complaint, for instance, of who 
“informed” Trzaska or his co-workers of these consequences.  
See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“[A] complaint [does not] suffice 
if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual 
enhancement.’” (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557)); 
Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 354 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(“Without addressing any of these facets of her transfer in her 
amended complaint [such as when the decision to transfer 
was made, the steps taken to effect the transfer, who prepared 
the transfer forms, and who signed the forms], Evancho’s 
allegation that Attorney General Fisher himself and/or his 
‘underlings’ carried out the transfer is simply a ‘bald 
assertion,’ which a court is not required to credit in deciding a 
motion to dismiss.”).  What is evident from an email 
attachment to the amended complaint is that Trzaska and his 
colleagues were encouraged by management to fulfill their 
job responsibilities to meet the existing quota.  See Hartig 
Drug Co. Inc. v. Senju Pharm. Co., 836 F.3d 261, 268 (3d 
Cir. 2016) (observing that a court considering a Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion may consider exhibits attached to the complaint).  For 
such efforts, management -- far from threatening 
“consequences” – expressed its gratitude. 
 
                                                                                                     
associate informs the firm that she will not violate her ethical 
duties by “padding” her billable hours to achieve the 
minimum, then that associate might, under the majority's rule, 
state a CEPA cause of action solely on the basis that she 
opposed the billable hours policy without any plausible 
allegation that the firm required her to violate her ethical 
duties. 
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Trzaska also relies on the fact that one his co-
employees opted to retire instead of complying with company 
policy.  Trzaska Br. 41.  That another employee disapproved 
of L’Oréal’s business practice, however, does not 
automatically render Trzaska’s beliefs objectively reasonable.  
See Blackburn, 179 F.3d at 93 n.4 (noting that reasonableness 
is measured according to the standard of a “reasonable lay 
person” (quoting Young, 645 A.2d at 1244)).  Trzaska finally 
maintains that his belief of wrongdoing was reasonable 
because L’Oréal’s own scientists admitted their inventions 
were not patentable.  Trzaska Br. 41.  This assertion, 
however, is merely a bald allegation unsupported by well-
pleaded facts.  Trzaska neither identified the inventors who 
expressed such reservations nor singled out any allegedly 
questionable inventions.  The District Court did not err in 
ruling that such conclusory allegations do not state a plausible 
claim.  
 
B. 
 
I would also affirm on the independent basis that 
Trzaska did not meet the heightened standard — requiring an 
actual violation of an RPC — that applies to him as an 
attorney.3  The New Jersey Supreme Court in Tartaglia v. 
UBS PaineWebber Inc. held that a plaintiff who is an attorney 
proceeding on a whistleblower claim must meet “a higher 
                                              
3 Our charge in interpreting a state statute such as CEPA is to 
predict how the highest court in the state would interpret it.  
In re Wettach, 811 F.3d 99, 114 (3d Cir. 2016).  In addition, 
“decisions of intermediate appellate state courts are indicative 
of how the state Supreme Court would interpret state law.”  
Id. 
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standard in order to maintain a . . . claim founded on a public 
policy embodied in an RPC.”  Tartaglia, 961 A.2d 1167, 1185 
(N.J. 2000); see generally Pierce v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 417 
A.2d 505, 512 (N.J. 1980).  Under this heightened standard, 
an attorney who seeks relief “must also demonstrate that the 
employer’s behavior about which she complained actually 
violated [the relevant rule of professional conduct].”  
Tartaglia, 961 A.2d at 1185 (emphasis added).  The Tartaglia 
court “ha[d] no difficulty in requiring more” of attorneys 
because they have particular knowledge about the RPCs as 
well as an independent obligation to report violations to the 
appropriate authorities.  Id.  This higher standard applies to 
common law and CEPA claims alike.  See id. at 1179;4 see 
also Gonzalez v. City of Camden, No. A-1222-11T4, 2012 
WL 6097076, at *1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Dec. 10, 2012) 
(per curiam) (applying higher standard for attorneys in CEPA 
cases and noting that the reasonableness of a plaintiff’s 
assertions must be viewed in the context of the fact that he “is 
an attorney”).   
 
Trzaska, as an attorney, must satisfy this more rigorous 
standard.  Because he did not allege that L’Oréal’s conduct 
“actually violate[d]” an RPC, however, he has not met the 
heightened standard articulated in Tartaglia, 961 A.2d at 
1185.  Accordingly, he has failed to allege a plausible 
                                              
4 CEPA and the common law whistleblower action in New 
Jersey under Pierce “exist side by side” and “the two avenues 
of relief are harmonious.”  Tartaglia, 961 A.2d at 1179.  That 
is why a plaintiff must elect his or her remedy; that is, a 
whistleblower may seek relief under common law or CEPA, 
but not both.  See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:19-8; Battaglia v. 
United Parcel Serv., Inc., 70 A.3d 602, 625 n.9 (N.J. 2013). 
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entitlement to relief under CEPA.  I would also affirm on this 
independent basis.   
 
III. 
 
 In sum, I do not believe that the District Court erred in 
concluding that Trzaska did not plead a viable CEPA claim 
because he failed to establish that L’Oréal had or would 
imminently violate a law, rule, regulation, or a clear mandate 
of public policy.  I would also hold that Trzaska failed to 
satisfy the heightened standard applying to him as an 
attorney.  Accordingly, I would affirm the District Court’s 
dismissal of his CEPA claim for failure to state a claim.  I 
respectfully dissent.  
 
